Imagine meeting a stranger and entering into a trusted economic exchange without needing a third party to vouch for you. What changes in your theoretical perspective in such a world? That model of interaction is what distributed trust technologies such as blockchain bring. I introduce the basic concept of distributed trust, describe some early instances, and highlight how organizational theories need to be updated to no longer rely upon fundamental assumptions about trust which are becoming outdated. Distributed trust fundamentally transforms boundaries of organizations and challenges assumptions about internalizing organizational functions to overcome market trust coordination issues. Implicit assumptions about the legitimacy and power of central network positions no longer ring true. This is very fertile ground for organizations research as the core tenet of the field-what roles and functions should group together within an organization-is being called into question at the most fundamental level.
Generative Curiosity
The bulk of organizational theory was created based upon the fundamental assumption that organizations are the best way to solve certain market-based trust coordination issues. The core assumption that organizations provide a centralized source of legitimacy underpinned the development of organizational ecology, institutional theory, and transaction cost economics. Centralized positions were assumed to be a source of power in network theory and resource dependence theory. While historically these have been valid assumptions, the recent emergence of distributed trust systems such as blockchain databases fundamentally challenges these core tenets of organizational theory (Seidel & Greve, 2017) . A blockchain database is an immutable ledger of transactions which is not maintained by a centralized organizational authority. It provides proof of historical transactions which can be trusted without authentication by a central authority (Swan, 2015) . Let that sink in for a second. Any type of ledger-a record of economic exchange, a reputation rating, or a certificate of authenticity-no longer requires a trusted third party to validate. This drastically affects previous assumptions about the legitimacy and power benefits of central network positions, and the fundamental organizing principle of financial capital markets.
Without going into the technical details of the cryptography, the underlying technology eliminates the ability for any single entity to change the ledger (Hackett, 2016) . Operating instead as a form of distributed trust, a public blockchain is duplicated and distributed through a Community Form (C-form) organization (Seidel & Stewart, 2011 ) over a shared global infrastructure with no centralized ownership or leadership. Fundamentally, it allows the creation of a permanent record of transactions without the need to trust a centralized organization to authenticate and keep track. This greatly reduces the potential informational power and legitimacy benefits of central network positions, and the subsequent returns for building and defending such centralized market positions. The ledger is maintained by the broader community instead of a single organization through multiple distributed copies constantly authenticated, cross-verified, and built upon the history of previous transactions. If a single entity attempts to change the record in a nonagreed upon way, the technology quickly invalidates such changes.
While still in its infancy, estimates place the current overall market capitalization of distributed trust enabled cryptocurrency markets at US$166.6 billion with more than 850 separate currencies (see Figure 1) . We currently do not have adequate organizational theory to explain this large distributed trust segment of rapidly growing economic activity. Blockchain technology was first brought to wide public attention through the creation of the non-government-backed cryptocurrency called Bitcoin in 2009, which allows people to directly exchange economic value using a public blockchain without
1 The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada using a financial institution intermediary (Miers, Garman, Green, & Rubin, 2013) . In other words, it takes banks and other financial intermediaries out of the financial transaction equation and allows parties to directly exchange value peer to peer. Blockchain allows two parties without any preestablished trust to enter directly into a transaction safely while providing a secure mechanism for honest actors to be properly compensated if another party defaults or acts in a nontrustworthy manner (Kosba, Miller, Shi, Wen, & Papamanthou, 2015) . Blockchain has been categorized as transforming economic transactions in a similarly disruptive way as to how email transformed sending mail by removing the need for a trusted third party such as the post office (Lee, 2016) .
Silicon Valley is an innovation ecosystem designed around the financialized model of venture capital-funded entrepreneurship (Kenney & von Burg, 2000) . At its core is the assumption that new organizations are designed to capture unique market positions, where they can socially construct the value of scaling and sell to investors. Many of the major recent Silicon Valley success stories are organizations who gain their power and legitimacy through creating scalable trusted platforms to enable economic activities of participants. Uber and AirBnb are platforms designed to enable trust between strangers for driving and lodging. Google and Facebook are platforms designed to enable consumers to aggregate and sell their demographic information to advertisers, regardless of what the perceived purpose is by consumers. The dozens of for-profit crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo are designed to enable trust between innovators and investors. While organizational theorists lament the downfall of the corporation through the "Uberfication" of economic activity into tasks and foresee a more localized economic post-corporate future built around democratic decision making (Davis, 2016) , distributed trust technologies enable such distributed forms without geographic constraints and without a profit motive.
A distributed trust platform can operate in a fully cooperative structure, without a for-profit entity owning and operating it. In fact, organizations such as Uber and Facebook face a direct competitive threat from distributed trust. Imagine a rider and a driver not needing a for-profit third party to help them find and trust each other. Imagine a consumer owning their own detailed demographic profile and choosing what to disclose to service providers in exchange for economic value, instead of an advertising platform such as Facebook profiting from that profile exchange. That is the world distributed trust is bringing-where providers of economic value can interact in a trusted manner directly with consumers with no need for a "middleman" to facilitate and profit from the transaction.
When you conceptualize a field in network terms, centralized structure creates the emergence of opportunities (Seidel, 2017) . Combining the high levels of historical centralization of major chunks of economic and societal activity (Davis, 2016) with the new feasibility of distributed trust technology solving previous trust-based coordination issues, many previously taken-for-granted centralized institutions will lose their power, legitimacy, and importance-including many of the Silicon Valley powerhouses currently considered to be "disrupting" traditional industries. This is a fundamental shockwave to the organization of societal activity. The developers of these new technologies are already discussing how decentralized organizations can be utilized collaboratively by individuals outside of a corporation to automate organizational governance and decision making in a decentralized C-form (Jentzsch, 2016) . The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is starting to use distributed trust technologies with the aim of providing financial services through noncentralized platforms to the more than 2 billion worldwide people who do not have bank accounts (Woyke, 2017) . Individual solar panel owners are already selling excess electricity directly to other consumers in automated peer-to-peer transactions without the involvement of centralized utility companies or centrally owned electric grids by using smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain in New York (Tapscott, 2016) . The blockchain's automated contracts are the sole enforcement mechanism of this very real economic transaction (Rutkin, 2016) . Powerful established centralized institutions are struggling with understanding this coming technological disruption and exploring the implications for their futures (Yermack, 2017) . Some have gone so far as to question the future role of centralized trust institutions such as stock markets (Lee, 2016) , banks (Lachance, 2016), governments (Ølnes, 2016) , and law firms (Crosby, Pattanayak, Verma, & Kalyanaraman, 2016) .
Distributed trust fundamentally transforms boundaries of organizations, and challenges assumptions about internalizing organizational functions to overcome market trust coordination issues. This is a very fertile research ground for organizational theorists, as the core tenet of the field-what roles and functions should group together within an organization-is being called into question at the most fundamental level. Trust is at the core of organizational creation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) . Major organizational theories such as organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) , institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987) , transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1993) , resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) , and network theory (Burt, 1995) all rely upon fundamental trust assumptions which need to be updated.
Taking organizational ecology as an example, Hannan and Freeman (1989) suggest centralized organizations have two primary advantages over "ad-hoc collectives" in their (a) reliability and (b) accountability. These advantages enable consumers to trust organizations and give them legitimacy benefits. They argue that while organizations inherently have higher cost structures than ad hoc collectives, the benefits accruing from their two primary advantages outweigh the higher costs of formal organization. As distributed trust eliminates the need for organizational boundaries to create reliability and accountability, this fundamental assumption fails and draws the entire conceptualization of the need for formal organization into question.
In discussing the fundamental construct of age dependence, Hannan (1998) builds on Stinchcombe's (1965) initial observations that reliance on the cooperation of strangers creates "jeopardy" for new organizations and highlights the importance of trust enabling collective action. He argues that as trust develops in an organization and its external relationships, the capabilities of that organization improve through the reduction of the lack of trust "friction." This creation of trust is the fundamental building block of the entire age dependence argument of organizational ecology. Yet distributed trust removes the time element from the equation, calling into question the entire theoretical basis of age dependence.
In developing Institutional Theory, Meyer and Rowan (1977) claim that a central issue is understanding why organizations form with rationalized formal structures. They argue that other organizational theories assume organizing solves coordination issues and that they make a mistake when assuming coordination and control are the key predictors of organizational success. They conclude with the core thesis of Institutional Theory-environments with more "rationalized myths" produce more formal organization with legitimacy claims. But in a world of distributed trust, the core need for organizational legitimacy claims is called into question.
Turning to transaction cost economics, Williamson (1993) argues bounded rationality and opportunism are the "key behavioral assumptions on which transaction cost economics relies." He acknowledges the underlying assumption that reputation embeddedness is a trust enforcement mechanism which is necessary because "complete contingent-claims contracting" is not feasible, and that due to the bounded rationality of economic actors, organizations solve such market failures. But distributed trust solves this key market failure, calling into question the primary organizing principle of transaction cost economics.
These are just a few clear examples intended to highlight that the core tenets of the key organizational theory paradigms were created in different technological times with underlying assumptions that no longer hold in such absolute terms with these shifts in technology. Based primarily upon the technological shift to "Web 2.0" online social networks, the field has already started to address shifting organizational boundaries enabled by distributed information creation. The advent of distributed trust brings this discussion to a whole new level of criticality. It is now more than a question of optimal organizational boundaries. It is a tectonic shift in underlying trust assumptions for the need and benefits of formal organization.
As a field, organizational theorists need to understand and be involved at this critical juncture as the organization of economic activity is transforming. As with any technological innovation, there are major transitional security concerns for distributed trust technologies (Lemieux, 2016) . Organizational theorists are uniquely positioned to figure out how society should deal with nefarious actors when there is no central organization to identify and target for regulatory enforcement. The "Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO)," was a $100 million corporation with no legal authority and recognized by no governmental agency, where the corporate bylaws were written entirely in automated "smart-contract" computer code on the Ethereum blockchain (Bannon, 2016) . The DAO's trials and tribulations, where it experienced a $50 million hack with no legal remedies possible and ultimately failed, have drawn into question the fundamental legal organizational principles of the corporate organizational form. While these security concerns are temporary stumbling blocks, organizational scholars must consider the longer term implications this fundamental shift to distributed trust will have on the organizational and societal landscape once the technical details are refined. We also need to better understand the implications for societal inequality. Organizational theorists studying organizational forms, misconduct, and inequality are all needed to help understand this new domain and help to shape it.
In the spirit of Generative Curiosity, I hope this brief introduction to the fundamental changes we are witnessing triggers you to think about your own research domain. Organizational theories need to be updated to no longer rely upon fundamental assumptions about centralized trust which are becoming outdated such as the power and legitimacy of large central network positions. This has strong implications for theories of organization, inequality, and community. Beyond the major organization theories, related fields such as organizational behavior, strategy, and entrepreneurship all have similar assumptions which need to be understood and updated.
What underlying assumptions about centralized trust do you make in your own work? How would instantaneous peer-to-peer trust with no need for a centralized third party change things? If you could meet a stranger and be able to enter into a trusted exchange without needing a third party, what changes in your theoretical perspective on the world? That model of interaction is what distributed trust brings. We as a field must be prepared for it to help understand the implications for societal outcomes, and hopefully help shift the evolution of the design of such systems to ensure a better more equitable future for all.
